higgsfield-websites

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to install its core command-line interface by piping a remote shell script directly into the interpreter (curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh | sh). This pattern is a critical security risk as it executes remote code without allowing the user to verify the script's content beforehand.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill and its references guide the user to download multiple external resources at runtime:
  • Fetches 3D game assets and animations via git clone from an unverified third-party repository (KayKit-Game-Assets).
  • Downloads a portable Blender binary and multiple system dependencies (.deb packages) from external sources to handle 3D processing in a sandbox environment.
  • The compose_cover.py script automatically fetches font files and branded wordmark assets from static.higgsfield.ai during execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Bash tool to orchestrate a complex build pipeline. This includes running system-level utilities like ffmpeg and Blender, as well as a large suite of included Python scripts designed to manipulate 3D models and image textures. The broad scope of these executions increases the risk of malicious command manipulation.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. It is designed to ingest detailed user-supplied 'design briefs' and 'intake' data, which are then used to drive file-writing and command-execution logic. The instructions do not include robust boundary markers or sanitization protocols to prevent adversarial content within these briefs from overriding the agent's safety guidelines or core mission parameters.
  • Ingestion points: Design briefs and user intake responses (processed in references/website-flow.md and references/app-flow.md).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the skill directly interpolates descriptive text from briefs into prompts for asset generation and code construction.
  • Capability inventory: Full filesystem access, network requests (curl/fetch), and arbitrary command execution (bash/python).
  • Sanitization: No explicit filtering or validation of user-provided copy before it is used in system-level operations.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/higgsfield-ai/cli/main/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 8, 2026, 03:24 PM