Fluxwing Library Browser

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and displays content from files within the project workspace that could be modified by external actors or other processes.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read component and screen definitions from ./fluxwing/components/, ./fluxwing/screens/, and ./fluxwing/library/ as documented in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat content from these files as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is configured with Read, Glob, and Grep capabilities, and its instructions imply the ability to perform file copy/write operations to move templates into the project library.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks any content validation or sanitization requirements for the files it processes from the workspace.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses path traversal ({SKILL_ROOT}/../) to access templates in sibling directories. While these paths (uxscii-component-creator and uxscii-screen-scaffolder) appear to be related functional components of the same toolset, traversing outside the skill root is a pattern that can lead to unintended data exposure if the environment is not strictly scoped.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 29, 2026, 08:16 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — Fluxwing Library Browser