Fluxwing Library Browser
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and displays content from files within the project workspace that could be modified by external actors or other processes.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read component and screen definitions from
./fluxwing/components/,./fluxwing/screens/, and./fluxwing/library/as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters provided to the agent to treat content from these files as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
Read,Glob, andGrepcapabilities, and its instructions imply the ability to perform file copy/write operations to move templates into the project library. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any content validation or sanitization requirements for the files it processes from the workspace.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill uses path traversal (
{SKILL_ROOT}/../) to access templates in sibling directories. While these paths (uxscii-component-creatoranduxscii-screen-scaffolder) appear to be related functional components of the same toolset, traversing outside the skill root is a pattern that can lead to unintended data exposure if the environment is not strictly scoped.
Audit Metadata