antigravity-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides extensive documentation for the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag. This flag is designed to auto-approve all tool permission requests without human interaction, effectively bypassing the security guardrails that require user review for potentially dangerous actions like file modifications or command execution. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the
agy plugin installandagy mcp addsubcommands, which facilitate the download and execution of external code from arbitrary sources, including GitHub repositories (e.g.,github.com/owner/repo/plugins/analyzer@main) and remote HTTP/SSE endpoints. These features allow the agent to ingest and execute third-party extensions that have not been verified. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documents the
agy remote-control startcommand, which registers and starts a background daemon service with the operating system's service manager (systemd, launchd, or background process). This mechanism allows theagyservice to remain active and reachable across user logouts and reboots, providing a persistence vector. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables an attack surface where the agent processes untrusted external data (via
view_fileorread_url_content) and has powerful tool access (run_command,write_file,plugin install). - Ingestion points: Files in the workspace, external URLs, and MCP server outputs.
- Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided instructions to protect against embedded malicious commands.
- Capability inventory: Full file system write access, arbitrary command execution (optionally auto-approved), and plugin management.
- Sanitization: No specific instructions for sanitizing or escaping untrusted external content before processing.
Audit Metadata