plink2-gwas-analysis
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches a binary executable in a ZIP archive from an external Amazon S3 bucket (https://s3.amazonaws.com/plink2-assets). While S3 is a well-known service, the specific bucket and content are not associated with an identified trusted vendor.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions command the agent to download the binary, modify its permissions (chmod +x), and execute it. This allows for the execution of unverified remote code without checksum or signature validation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to manage files (unzip), change file modes (chmod), and modify the system path to enable binary execution.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted genotype and phenotype files, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Reads VCF, BGEN, and phenotype/covariate text files from the user's environment. \n
- Boundary markers: Absent; no instructions are provided to delimit or ignore instructions embedded in the data. \n
- Capability inventory: Can execute the external plink2 binary and run Python scripts with data science libraries. \n
- Sanitization: Absent; no validation or escaping of processed file content is performed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata