sciagent-skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/scaffold.pyexecutes thepixi run validatecommand using thesubprocess.runmethod to verify the repository state after scaffolding operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection during the scaffolding process where untrusted user input is written to persistent files.
- Ingestion points: The skill collects a
descriptionand other metadata from the user which are passed as arguments toscripts/scaffold.py(referenced inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The generated
SKILL.mduses YAML frontmatter delimiters (---), but the script fails to escape double quotes when interpolating thedescriptionfield into the YAML block. - Capability inventory: The
scaffold.pyscript has the capability to create new directories, write theSKILL.mdfile, and append entries toregistry.yaml(documented inscripts/scaffold.py). - Sanitization: While the
nameandtagsfields undergo regex validation, thedescriptionfield is not sanitized or escaped, enabling an attacker to inject new YAML keys or malicious instructions into the created skill context.
Audit Metadata