sf-ai-agentforce-testing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several files (e.g.,
assets/cli-auth-guardrail-tests.yaml,assets/guardrail-tests.yaml, andreferences/multi-turn-testing.md) contain prompt injection strings such as 'Ignore all your previous instructions'. These are explicitly used as test case utterances to verify that the agent's guardrails correctly intercept and block such attempts, rather than as instructions for the analyzing agent. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages External Client App (ECA) credentials for Salesforce API access. The
hooks/scripts/credential_manager.pyscript implements secure local storage in~/.sfagent/using restricted file permissions (0600/0700) and automatically creates a.gitignorefile to prevent accidental commits. It masks secrets in terminal output, following standard security practices for local credential management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a data ingestion surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It parses agent metadata (XML/DSL) in
agent_discovery.pyand YAML test scenarios inmulti_turn_test_runner.py. While it lacks explicit boundary markers for this content, the ingestion is required for its primary purpose of analyzing and testing AI agents. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple Python scripts (
hooks/scripts/multi_turn_fix_loop.py,hooks/scripts/run-automated-tests.py) usesubprocess.run()to orchestrate CLI commands and other scripts. Analysis confirms that command arguments are passed as lists withoutshell=True, preventing shell injection vulnerabilities.
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