sf-apex
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The hook scripts
apex-lsp-validate.pyandpost-tool-validate.pymodify the Python system path (sys.path) at runtime to import modules from computed paths located in the user's home directory (~/.claude/). This practice of loading code from mutable external locations represents a security risk if the directory permissions are not strictly controlled. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes external command-line tools to perform its functions. Specifically,
prettier-format.pyuses thesubprocessmodule to execute the Prettier formatter, andapex-lsp-validate.pyrelies on a shell wrapper (apex_wrapper.sh) to interface with the Apex Language Server. These executions interact with the underlying host system and depend on the integrity of the installed binaries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an automated feedback loop where diagnostics generated from analyzing user-supplied Apex code are fed back into the agent's context to trigger "auto-fix" operations. This design creates an attack surface where maliciously crafted comments or code patterns within the files being reviewed could potentially influence the agent's instructions or lead to the generation of insecure code.
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