sf-datacloud

SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s behavior mostly matches its stated Salesforce Data Cloud orchestration purpose, but it relies on installing and linking a community plugin from a personal GitHub repository and documents a pipe-to-Python installer. Data flows appear proportionate and there is no clear credential harvesting or exfiltration, so this is not confirmed malware; the main concern is third-party runtime trust and the expanded execution footprint from linked external code.

The supplied material is setup documentation, not evidence of malware. It introduces a meaningful software supply-chain risk because it instructs users to fetch and execute unpinned remote installer and plugin code, install dependencies with lifecycle execution, and link the result into Salesforce CLI. No direct malicious behavior or data theft is visible in this fragment; risk depends on the external repository, installer, dependencies, and plugin implementation.

The script is intended to verify Salesforce CLI and Data Cloud availability for an optional Salesforce organization. It contains a command-injection vulnerability in the fallback smoke-check path: a malicious ORG value can escape the embedded double quotes and inject shell commands when bash -lc executes the generated command. The direct sf invocations are safely argument-quoted, but the fallback path should avoid shell evaluation, for example by invoking commands directly or by passing the organization value through a safely quoted argument mechanism. No clear malware, credential theft, persistence, or obfuscation is present.

This script is primarily a high-impact supply-chain installer. While the bash fragment itself contains no explicit malware/persistence/exfiltration logic, it fetches a repository whose URL is environment-influencable and then immediately executes installation/build steps (yarn install, npx/tsc, and node manifest generation) and links/runs the resulting plugin (sf plugins link, sf data360 man). Because there is no pinning to a specific revision and no integrity/signature verification in this wrapper, compromise of the repo, a dependency, or the PLUGIN_REPO value can lead to arbitrary code execution on the installing machine during dependency installation/build/verification.