sf-diagram-nanobananapro
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user-supplied data (Salesforce code and image generation prompts) and incorporates it into requests sent to the Google Gemini model, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: User code is pasted into templates in
assets/review/apex-review.mdandassets/review/lwc-review.md. Custom image prompts are provided as command-line arguments toscripts/generate_image.py. - Boundary markers: The review templates use basic text headers such as
CODE:to separate input, providing minimal protection against adversarial instructions. Image prompts are interpolated directly into the API request. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network operations via the Google Gemini API, writes files to the local filesystem, and executes shell commands to open images.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping user-provided content before it is processed by the external AI.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests a remote installation pattern for a prerequisite tool.
- Evidence: The
scripts/check-prerequisites.shscript recommends the commandcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shto install theuvPython manager. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python utility
scripts/generate_image.pyexecutes a system command to display output files to the user. - Evidence: The script uses
subprocess.run(["open", output_path])to launch the default image viewer on macOS.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata