sf-diagram-nanobananapro

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user-supplied data (Salesforce code and image generation prompts) and incorporates it into requests sent to the Google Gemini model, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: User code is pasted into templates in assets/review/apex-review.md and assets/review/lwc-review.md. Custom image prompts are provided as command-line arguments to scripts/generate_image.py.
  • Boundary markers: The review templates use basic text headers such as CODE: to separate input, providing minimal protection against adversarial instructions. Image prompts are interpolated directly into the API request.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes network operations via the Google Gemini API, writes files to the local filesystem, and executes shell commands to open images.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping user-provided content before it is processed by the external AI.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill suggests a remote installation pattern for a prerequisite tool.
  • Evidence: The scripts/check-prerequisites.sh script recommends the command curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh to install the uv Python manager.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Python utility scripts/generate_image.py executes a system command to display output files to the user.
  • Evidence: The script uses subprocess.run(["open", output_path]) to launch the default image viewer on macOS.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 05:49 PM