flutter-soul-stewardship
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes embedded Python scripts (in
SKILL.mdandreferences/system-prompt-rebuild.md) used to modifyconfig.yamlandSOUL.mdfiles at runtime. These scripts perform complex file I/O and YAML manipulation to update agent system prompts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands and the
hermesCLI is documented to automate the management of agent profiles and their configurations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a significant attack surface by facilitating the modification of
agent.system_promptacross all swarm profiles. - Ingestion points: The
new_stringparameter inpatchcalls and thenew_prompt_with_plain_newlinesvariable in Python scripts. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the updated content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
patch,read_file,hermes config set, and direct Python file writes to achieve its goals. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill performs direct string replacement and YAML overwriting without validation or filtering of the content being injected into the system prompts.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly describe methods to bypass "cross-profile soft guards" intended to restrict writing to other agents' directories. This includes using a
cross_profile=trueflag and a Python-based shell bypass that directly writes to files, circumventing platform-level tool restrictions.
Audit Metadata