flutter-soul-stewardship

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes embedded Python scripts (in SKILL.md and references/system-prompt-rebuild.md) used to modify config.yaml and SOUL.md files at runtime. These scripts perform complex file I/O and YAML manipulation to update agent system prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands and the hermes CLI is documented to automate the management of agent profiles and their configurations.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a significant attack surface by facilitating the modification of agent.system_prompt across all swarm profiles.
  • Ingestion points: The new_string parameter in patch calls and the new_prompt_with_plain_newlines variable in Python scripts.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions in the updated content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses patch, read_file, hermes config set, and direct Python file writes to achieve its goals.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill performs direct string replacement and YAML overwriting without validation or filtering of the content being injected into the system prompts.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions explicitly describe methods to bypass "cross-profile soft guards" intended to restrict writing to other agents' directories. This includes using a cross_profile=true flag and a Python-based shell bypass that directly writes to files, circumventing platform-level tool restrictions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 3, 2026, 04:34 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — flutter-soul-stewardship