codex-app-server
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion of untrusted user input which is then passed to a language model.
- Ingestion points: User input is processed via the
turn/startmethod in multiple files, includingassets/node-stdio-starter/src/index.tsandassets/nextjs-web-sidecar/app/api/codex/session/route.ts. - Boundary markers: The provided starter code does not implement explicit boundary markers or delimiters for user input, relying instead on the underlying protocol.
- Capability inventory: The skill documentation (e.g.,
references/protocol-and-events.md) confirms that the server can perform sensitive actions such ascommandExecutionandfileChange. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the user-provided text input is demonstrated in the client-side starter templates.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation and implementation provide mechanisms for executing commands on the host system.
- Evidence: The protocol supports a
commandExecutionitem type, as described inreferences/protocol-and-events.md. While the protocol includes arequestApprovalflow, this functionality grants the agent the ability to execute shell commands if the user or host app approves. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on spawning a local sidecar process to handle the application logic.
- Evidence: The Node.js and Swift starter codes (e.g.,
assets/existing-app-auth-bridge/src/client.tsandassets/swift-bridge-patterns/MacOSProcessBridge.swift) usechild_process.spawnandProcessto execute thecodexbinary from the system PATH. This is a core architectural feature of the integration but constitutes dynamic process execution.
Audit Metadata