docxmakebetter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile uses imperative override language to control the agent's behavior during documentation processing, specifically commands like 'MANDATORY - READ ENTIRE FILE' and 'NEVER set any range limits'.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing system binaries for core functionality via
subprocess.runwithshell=False: ooxml/scripts/pack.pyexecutessoffice(LibreOffice) to perform document conversion and validation.ooxml/scripts/validation/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto provide word-level and character-level comparisons between document versions.- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]:
SKILL.mddocumentation instructs the agent or user to install dependencies usingsudo apt-get installfor packages likepandoc,libreoffice, andpoppler-utils. This facilitates the use of elevated privileges within the execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary operation involves unpacking and reading XML data from external Word documents, which is a classic vector for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External document content is ingested in
ooxml/scripts/unpack.py, processed for validation inooxml/scripts/validation/base.py, and edited via theDocumentlibrary inscripts/document.py. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to treat document content as potentially adversarial text.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write to the local filesystem and execute system commands (
soffice,git) based on the data it reads. - Sanitization: While the skill correctly uses
defusedxmlto mitigate XML-specific infrastructure attacks (such as XXE), it performs no sanitization or filtering of the natural language instructions contained within the documents themselves.
Audit Metadata