watercooler
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the Python
subprocessmodule and shell scripts to wrap local command-line tools includingclaude,codex, and the customwatercoolerservice. These calls are parameterized and use safe execution patterns, such as passing arguments as lists, to prevent shell injection vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As a message relay between AI agents, the skill handles untrusted data originating from different session contexts. It mitigates the risk of indirect injection by wrapping all relayed content in 'envelopes' that clearly label the provenance of the message, distinguishing collaborator input from owner instructions, and explicitly warning the receiving agent about permission boundaries.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages session state, bindings, and delivery receipts in local directories (e.g.,
~/Library/Application Support/ClaudeAdvisor). It strictly enforces secure file permissions usingumask 077andchmod 600to ensure this metadata remains private to the local user and inaccessible to other processes. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The advisory functionality implemented in
scripts/consult-claude-model.shutilizes Claude Code's restricted mode to enforce a read-only environment. It explicitly limits the advisor model's capabilities to a minimal set of tools (Read,Grep,Glob) and denies access to dangerous operations such as shell execution, file writing, and network access.
Audit Metadata