scheduler
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
slots.pyscript dynamically loads and executes Python code from a relative path using theimportlib.utilmodule. - Evidence: The
_pipeline()function inslots.pyconstructs a path to../pipeline/deals.pyand usesspec.loader.exec_module(mod)to load and run its contents. - Risk: This pattern creates a dependency on code outside the skill's immediate directory. While intended for sharing logic between sibling skills (e.g., 'pipeline'), it allows for potential code execution if the external path is modified or points to an unintended file.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted text from contact replies to automate scheduling tasks, creating a surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: The
parsecommand inslots.pyaccepts untrusted message text via the--textargument. - Boundary markers: The skill's instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly mandate a user confirmation step ("Reply yes or no") before any calendar event is booked or invite is sent. - Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing
.icsfiles to the filesystem and modifying CRM data (deal stages) via the shared pipeline module. - Sanitization: The script uses regular expression matching (
TIME_RE,DAY_RE,DATE_RE) to extract specific temporal patterns, which effectively filters out non-date instructions, although it does not sanitize the input for other downstream uses.
Audit Metadata