thai-contextual-editor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes arbitrary text from a repository (UI strings, documentation, and source files) while possessing high-privilege capabilities like file writing and command execution.
- Ingestion points: Processes Thai text and UI strings extracted from the user's repository via the
/thaicommands. - Boundary markers: While it instructs the agent to preserve placeholders (e.g.,
%s,{{name}}), it lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested repository content as untrusted data, which could allow malicious instructions embedded in those files to influence agent behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Write,Edit, andBashtools, allowing it to modify the repository and execute shell commands. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external repository content before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to interact with the environment and manage its workflow. - Evidence: It executes
git rev-parse --git-pathto identify the repository structure and usesherdr agent promptto communicate with other agents on the platform. - Context: It generates shell commands for the user, such as
nvim <worksheet-path>, to facilitate manual review. It also manages temporary files in${TMPDIR}for inter-agent communication.
Audit Metadata