engineer-expertise-extractor
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content from external, untrusted sources (GitHub Pull Request titles, bodies, and comments) and stores them in a structured knowledge base without sanitization. If a GitHub contribution contains malicious instructions or jailbreak attempts, they will be persisted in the engineer's profile and may influence an AI agent that later uses the profile as context.
- Ingestion points: The script
scripts/extract_engineer.shfetches pull request details, including titles and bodies, using thegh pr viewcommand. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use boundary markers or delimiters when writing external content to the markdown files in the
engineer_profiles/directory. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (via the GitHub CLI) and write to the local file system.
- Sanitization: The script performs no sanitization or filtering of the text content extracted from GitHub contributions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The interactive script
scripts/extract_engineer.shcontains a command injection vulnerability in theprompt_inputhelper function. - Evidence: The function uses
eval "$var_name=\"$input\""to assign user-provided input to variables. This allows a user to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing input containing command substitution patterns (e.g.,$(command)or`command`). - Impact: While this requires local interactive input, it represents a security flaw in how the skill handles its own configuration and execution flow.
Audit Metadata