engineer-expertise-extractor

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches content from external, untrusted sources (GitHub Pull Request titles, bodies, and comments) and stores them in a structured knowledge base without sanitization. If a GitHub contribution contains malicious instructions or jailbreak attempts, they will be persisted in the engineer's profile and may influence an AI agent that later uses the profile as context.
  • Ingestion points: The script scripts/extract_engineer.sh fetches pull request details, including titles and bodies, using the gh pr view command.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not use boundary markers or delimiters when writing external content to the markdown files in the engineer_profiles/ directory.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (via the GitHub CLI) and write to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: The script performs no sanitization or filtering of the text content extracted from GitHub contributions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The interactive script scripts/extract_engineer.sh contains a command injection vulnerability in the prompt_input helper function.
  • Evidence: The function uses eval "$var_name=\"$input\"" to assign user-provided input to variables. This allows a user to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing input containing command substitution patterns (e.g., $(command) or `command`).
  • Impact: While this requires local interactive input, it represents a security flaw in how the skill handles its own configuration and execution flow.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 07:35 PM