gate-push
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Success check' section defines a bash script that executes the GitHub CLI using raw user input. Specifically, the line
gh pr list --head <branch-name>interpolates the<branch-name>argument directly into a shell environment. If a user provides a branch name like; touch malicious.txt #, the shell will execute the command following the semicolon. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves data from an external tool (
mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_list) and uses the resulting 'issue' or 'plan' fields as arguments for another skill invocation (dh:complete-implementation). This creates an indirect prompt injection vulnerability if the content of the backlog item is controlled by an untrusted source. - Ingestion points: External backlog data retrieved via the
mcp__plugin_dh_backlog__backlog_listtool in the 'Branch -> backlog lookup algorithm' section. - Boundary markers: None; the output from the backlog tool is used directly as a parameter for the next skill.
- Capability inventory: Execution of shell commands via
ghand triggering secondary skills likedh:complete-implementation. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the retrieved
targetor the user-suppliedbranch_namebefore they are used in executable or instructional contexts.
Audit Metadata