gate-push
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
ghcommand-line tool to verify PR visibility using raw user input (branch_name). The instructiongh pr list --head <branch-name>allows an attacker to perform shell command injection. For example, a branch name likemain; touch /tmp/pwnedwould result in the execution of the injected command after the intended GitHub command. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its ingestion of the
<branch-name>argument. - Ingestion points: The variable
branch_nameis captured directly from$ARGUMENTSinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers, delimiters, or instructions provided to the agent to treat the branch name as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess calls via
uv runfor backlog lookups andghfor pull request listing. - Sanitization: While the skill performs some character replacement for a 'normalized slug', it explicitly uses the original, unsanitized
branch_namefor the final shell execution in the success check step.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata