gitlab-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile uses the!commandsyntax to executescripts/gitlab_context.pyat skill load time. This script performs network operations and local environment scanning before user interaction. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The script
scripts/validate_glfm.pyattempts to read the user's~/.bashrcfile to extractGITLAB_TOKEN. Accessing shell configuration files is a sensitive operation that exposes the contents of the user's environment profile. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts (
get_gitlab_context.py,gitlab_context.py) usesubprocess.runorgitpythonto execute shell commands (glab,git). While used for context gathering, this provides a mechanism for arbitrary command execution if arguments are improperly handled. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from
.gitlab-ci.ymlfiles and GitLab API responses (pipeline status, commit messages) viagitlab_context.pywithout explicit sanitization or boundary markers. This creates a surface where malicious content in a repository could influence agent behavior. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/sync_gitlab_docs.pyscript downloads a documentation archive fromgitlab.comand replaces local files. Although the source is a well-known service, the automated download and extraction of remote content into the skill's reference directory is a significant capability. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
references/gitlab-ci-local-guide.mdfile contains placeholder credentials likeglpat-YOUR_TOKEN_HERE. While these are placeholders, the skill's design encourages users to store sensitive tokens in local configuration files (~/.gitlab-ci-local/variables.yml) which the skill's scripts then access.
Audit Metadata