meta-inspector

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local file paths containing agent interaction history and session logs.
  • Evidence: references/extraction-patterns.md provides SQL queries for ~/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonl and /tmp/claude-*/tasks/*.output.
  • Context: While no network exfiltration tools are used, the exposure of these sensitive logs to the agent's context is a significant data access surface.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical data (agent transcripts) which could contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the current session.
  • Ingestion points: The skill is specifically designed to ingest JSONL session files and agent output transcripts as defined in references/extraction-patterns.md.
  • Boundary markers: Instructions in SKILL.md attempt to limit the agent to "raw facts only," but there are no technical boundary markers or delimiters provided for the data being parsed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes mcp__plugin_agentskill-kaizen_kaizen-duckdb__execute_query, Read, Grep, and Glob tools to retrieve information.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction filtering for the data ingested from transcripts or reports.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 3, 2026, 10:28 AM