meta-inspector
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local file paths containing agent interaction history and session logs.
- Evidence:
references/extraction-patterns.mdprovides SQL queries for~/.claude/projects/*/*.jsonland/tmp/claude-*/tasks/*.output. - Context: While no network exfiltration tools are used, the exposure of these sensitive logs to the agent's context is a significant data access surface.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted historical data (agent transcripts) which could contain adversarial instructions intended to influence the current session.
- Ingestion points: The skill is specifically designed to ingest JSONL session files and agent output transcripts as defined in
references/extraction-patterns.md. - Boundary markers: Instructions in
SKILL.mdattempt to limit the agent to "raw facts only," but there are no technical boundary markers or delimiters provided for the data being parsed. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
mcp__plugin_agentskill-kaizen_kaizen-duckdb__execute_query,Read,Grep, andGlobtools to retrieve information. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction filtering for the data ingested from transcripts or reports.
Audit Metadata