orchestrating-python-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines workflows that ingest untrusted user requirements and codebase paths which are passed to subagents. These subagents have the authority to modify the filesystem and execute commands, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly instructs agents to ingest "user requirements verbatim" and "existing codebase paths" in the TDD, Feature Addition, and Debugging workflows.
- Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions for applying boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating untrusted requirements into agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: The workflow delegates to agents like
python-cli-architectwhich can write code to files, and includes validation steps that execute shell commands such asuv run pytestandbandit. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization or validation logic for the user-supplied requirements before they are processed by the planning or implementation agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the orchestrator to have agents execute various shell commands for development automation and quality assurance.
- Evidence: The workflows include commands for package management and testing using
uv, specificallyuv run pytestfor test execution,uv run banditfor security scanning, anduv run mutmutfor mutation testing. - Evidence: The skill uses the
/python-engineering:shebangpythoncommand, which is described as directly editing files to ensure PEP 723 compliance.
Audit Metadata