rtfp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data in the form of AI session transcripts.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads session logs (e.g.,
.jsonlfiles) viamcp__frustration-analyzer__list_sessionsandReadtools to extract message content. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters provided to the primary agent or the subagents (
frustration-analyzer:batch-detector,frustration-analyzer:context-reconstructor) to ignore instructions embedded within the transcript text. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to
ReadandWritefiles, performGloboperations, and execute multiple MCP tools that handle sensitive session data. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the transcript content before it is processed by LLM subagents, creating a surface where malicious instructions inside a transcript could influence the agent's behavior.
- [DATA_EXFLLTRATION]: While the skill does not automatically send data to a remote server, its primary purpose is to extract and reconstruct potentially sensitive transcript data into a PNG format specifically described as "ready for social media." This workflow facilitates the movement of private session data (which may include code, keys, or personal info) from a protected local environment to a format and context intended for external public disclosure.
Audit Metadata