agent-sort
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the local repository to make decisions about which agent capabilities to activate.
- Ingestion points: Processes repository manifests (package.json, pyproject.toml, etc.) and documentation files (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent. No explicit delimiters or warnings are used to prevent the agent from obeying instructions embedded in the analyzed files.
- Capability inventory: Reads files via shell commands and manages the installation/activation of other skills and rules.
- Sanitization: None detected. The skill relies on direct evidence from file content without filtering.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses local shell commands (
rg,cat) to establish project context. While used legitimately for analysis, these tools provide the mechanism for the agent to access the file system based on potentially untrusted repository content.
Audit Metadata