grok-build-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
terminalandprocesstools to interact with thegrokCLI and system utilities. - Evidence: Examples include managing background processes, utilizing
tmuxfor interactive sessions, and usinggitworktrees for isolation. - Evidence: Commands such as
stat,ps, andlsofare used for monitoring session progress and detecting stalled runs, which is a legitimate use case for process management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the delegation of tasks to an external AI agent (Grok), which creates an indirect prompt injection surface where the external agent's output could influence the primary agent's context.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-supplied task briefs that are passed as arguments to
grok -pinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The documentation explicitly recommends using
--permission-mode dontAskand--denyrules for review-only runs to limit the capabilities of the external agent. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
terminalandprocesstools which allow for file system writes, command execution, and network access (if not denied viagrokflags). - Sanitization: The instructions strongly emphasize the need for independent verification of diffs, running tests, and performing
git diff --checkbefore committing any changes produced by the external agent.
Audit Metadata