meta-cognition-parallel
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an indirect prompt injection surface by design, as it interpolates raw user input into the context of sub-agent tasks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through the
$ARGUMENTSvariable in theSKILL.mdparsing logic. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a simple markdown header (
## User Query) to separate instructions from user data, which can be bypassed by adversarial input. - Capability inventory: The skill triggers
general-purposesub-agents using theTaskprimitive; it does not explicitly invoke dangerous capabilities like arbitrary shell execution or network requests in the primary file. - Sanitization: No input sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is applied to
$ARGUMENTSbefore it is added to the sub-agent prompts. - [SAFE]: The skill attempts to access configuration files in a parent directory (
../../agents/). This is interpreted as a standard file-system operation for a multi-component agent setup and does not target sensitive system credentials or user data.
Audit Metadata