skills/jarmen423/skills/sprites/Gen Agent Trust Hub

sprites

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: A plaintext API key is hardcoded in the 'Project Context' section of SKILL.md (value: 7a4b2ef1a7b209016ce2670b6b01fc3066a3553bfae0b0745aaf44266dba724c). This key is intended for authentication with the am_server backend and is not a placeholder.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates remote shell command execution on Sprites microVMs via a WebSocket-based Exec API (wss://api.sprites.dev/v1/sprites/{name}/exec), as documented in both SKILL.md and references/api-workflows.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow documentation in references/api-workflows.md explicitly instructs the use of management commands such as systemctl restart, pkill, and ps aux to control services and monitor processes on remote systems.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process external data that could contain malicious instructions, such as tailing logs or reading files from remote microVMs. Ingestion points: Filesystem API (GET /v1/sprites/{name}/fs/{path}) and execution output from tailing logs in references/api-workflows.md. Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded commands in the data. Capability inventory: Broad capabilities including remote shell access, filesystem manipulation, and service management. Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or content sanitization is provided.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 28, 2026, 04:04 PM