signatories-axi
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements a
hook installcommand that modifies the agent's configuration file at.claude/settings.json. This adds aSessionStarthook, ensuring thesignatories-axi homecommand executes automatically whenever a new agent session begins. - Evidence: The
installfunction inscripts/signatories-axi.mjscallscomputeSessionStartHookUpdateandwriteSettingsto persist a command in the agent's settings. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill enables the export of feedback comments from an external API for processing by an LLM, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The
feedback exportcommand inSKILL.mdandscripts/signatories-axi.mjsfetches document comments from the Signatories API. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide or enforce delimiters or safety warnings for the LLM when processing this external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions for network operations, local file writes, and modifying agent configuration files.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the ingested comments before they are presented to the agent.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs shell command strings and writes them into the agent's session configuration to enable the automated dashboard functionality.
- Evidence: The variable
PROJECT_HOOK_COMMANDinscripts/signatories-axi.mjscontains a command string that is written to.claude/settings.jsonduring the installation process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local shell commands to determine the environment state, such as identifying the project root.
- Evidence: The
gitRootfunction inscripts/signatories-axi.mjsusesexecSync("git rev-parse --show-toplevel")to interact with the underlying system.
Audit Metadata