suede-newsroom
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [SAFE]: The skill implements strong security boundaries by explicitly forbidding the agent from publishing, scheduling, or sending content autonomously. Step 5 and the 'Boundaries' section in
SKILL.mdandCARD.mdmandate human approval for all public-facing assets. - [SAFE]: Role isolation is enforced to prevent context bleed and maintain specialized focus.
references/role-contracts.mdprovides distinct instructions ('contracts') for six different roles, ensuring that each agent handles only a specific part of the pipeline. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest external data from URLs and founder recordings.
- Ingestion points: The
Signal scoutandResearcherroles inreferences/role-contracts.mdare instructed to read from external URLs. TheFounder intakeprocess inreferences/founder-content-loop.mdingests interview transcripts and voice notes. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured 'Campaign Record' (
references/campaign-record.md) to delimit data and requires theResearcherto strictly separate verified claims from inferences and unproven statements. - Capability inventory: The skill is limited to reading data and writing markdown records/drafts within the local
.agents/newsroom/directory. It does not utilize shell commands, network exfiltration tools, or dynamic execution environments. - Sanitization: Verification is built into the workflow; the
Researchermust provide a URL for every consequential claim and theEditorrole performs a 'Claim integrity' check to ensure no unsupported content is added. Human review is the final sanitization gate.
Audit Metadata