The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions in Step 3 that command the AI agent to override platform-level constraints. It uses phrases like "this skill wins for Step 3" and "permission (overrides conflicting guidance)" to force the agent to modify files in environments (like Plan mode) that are typically restricted to read-only operations for safety.
[DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is hardcoded to send data to a specific Slack recipient (User ID "U0APWBBSRC4"). While this matches the author's description of "DMing Jason," the automated transmission of local file content and ticket summaries to a hardcoded external ID represents a data exposure risk.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the execution of shell commands, including the word count utility (wc -w) and a custom script (prepare_thread_reply_message.sh) that executes embedded Python code to manipulate file contents.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted external data.
Ingestion points: Sketch files (Step 2) and Linear ticket URLs (Step 1) provided by the user.
Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to use delimiters or to ignore instructions embedded within the sketch files or ticket data.
Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to send messages externally via Slack, write files locally via CreatePlan, and execute shell scripts.
Sanitization: Absent. Data from external files is read and processed without validation, escaping, or filtering.

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