implement-all
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates a
Workflowscript using theWORKFLOW.mdtemplate and ticket-specific data, then executes it to perform implementation and verification tasks. It also extracts and runs a "verify command" and "clean-install command" defined in the repository'sCLAUDE.mdor CI configuration, which constitutes execution of code defined in the target environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub issue bodies, titles, and labels to parameterize its workflow and agent prompts. This introduces a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection where an attacker-controlled ticket could influence the agent's behavior during implementation or verification phases.
- Ingestion points: Ticket metadata and content (body, title, labels) are fetched via
gh issue viewinSKILL.md(Arm and Tick sequences). - Boundary markers: The skill does not define or use explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings for the interpolated ticket content.
- Capability inventory: The skill (across
SKILL.mdandWORKFLOW.md) utilizes shell command execution (git,gh, local toolchain), file system modification (git worktree), and network access (pushing/pulling to GitHub). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input data from GitHub issues is performed before use in downstream tasks.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on extensive execution of shell commands through the GitHub CLI (
gh) and Git. The use of string interpolation for command arguments (e.g., in stack tip derivation and assignee checks inSKILL.md) presents a potential surface for command injection if API responses contain unexpected malicious characters.
Audit Metadata