brief-team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from the repository which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
git diffoutput, git commit messages, and files located indocs/specs/and.skills/directories. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit syntactic boundary markers (like XML tags) in its prompts, but it includes a strong instruction-level boundary by defining these inputs as "passive data" and explicitly commanding the agent to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files to the repository (
docs/explainers/) and execute shell commands (git,grep). - Sanitization: The
references/passive-data-safety.mdfile mandates redacting secrets (API keys, tokens) and escaping content when embedding it into HTML/JS contexts. The providedshell/packet.htmltemplate uses basic HTML entity replacement for some fields, though body sections are rendered viainnerHTMLwhich requires the agent to correctly pre-sanitize the content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill pipeline involves executing shell commands to gather git data and verify the resulting output file.
- Evidence: Step 11 in
SKILL.mddefines a shell script utilizinggrepto verify the generated HTML file's structure. - Safety Mechanism: The "Slug resolver" in
SKILL.mdimplements a mechanical sanitization process that restricts characters to[a-z0-9-]and truncates length, which effectively prevents command injection when these slugs are used as filenames in shell commands. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and writes HTML files that include embedded JavaScript logic for rendering data.
- Evidence:
shell/packet.htmlcontains a script block that processes awindow.__PACKET__JSON object injected by the agent at runtime. This constitutes template-based code generation.
Audit Metadata