forge-prompt
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a conduit for indirect prompt injection because it transforms untrusted user-provided descriptions and repository data into a structured prompt that will be interpreted by a different AI session.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests an initial user request (ask) and collects further details through a multi-step interview process. It also queries the local repository to identify file paths and object identities in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill implements structural boundaries in its output, such as
Off limits,Must keep working, andOpensections, which are designed to help the receiving agent distinguish between constraints and variable task data. - Capability inventory: The skill uses chat interactions and reads repository content to fulfill its purpose. It also utilizes the
clarify-decisionssub-skill and has the ability to write prompt artifacts to the local file system at.skills/prompts/<slug>.md. - Sanitization: The skill employs a 'pointers, not paste' policy, instructing the agent to provide file paths or IDs instead of verbatim file contents. This reduces the volume of untrusted content that could be used for injection attacks in the receiving session.
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