internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to gather data from external communication platforms to compile internal updates, which presents an indirect prompt injection risk if the source channels contain adversarial inputs.\n
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled from Slack messages, emails, Google Drive documents, calendar events, and external press as outlined in
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.md.\n - Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions are provided to insulate the agent from commands embedded within the retrieved data.\n
- Capability inventory: No executable scripts or tool configurations are supplied by the skill itself; it relies entirely on platform-level tool permissions.\n
- Sanitization: Absent. There are no guidelines telling the agent to sanitize, escape, or filter out instructions found within external text.\n- [NO_CODE]: The skill repository contains only markdown templates, instructions, and standard text documentation without any code files, installation scripts, or software dependencies.
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