crush
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill loads content from local files (
.honne/personas/antipattern.md,.honne/personas/signature.md, and.honne/personas/judge.md) and instructs the agent to "apply [the] system prompt mentally." This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions in these files could influence agent behavior. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(and language variants) reads from the.honne/personas/directory. - Boundary markers: Absent. No delimiters or warnings are provided to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions inside the persona files.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
bashand read arbitrary content from specified local paths. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not validate or sanitize the "system prompts" extracted from the persona files before applying them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using
bashin Step 2 to verify the existence of persona files via a local script path:bash "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/honne" persona check.
Audit Metadata