ship
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection as it processes untrusted data from the repository environment to drive its decision-making logic.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from
git status,git log, andgh pr viewoutput inscripts/preflight.shandscripts/backfill-pr.sh. It also readsREADME.mdandAGENTS.mdto perform documentation updates. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in commit messages or repository files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including file system modification (
CHANGELOG.json,README.md), shell command execution (git,gh, quality gates), and network operations viagit pushand GitHub PR creation. - Sanitization: In
scripts/preflight.sh, the skill constructs JSON output using a shell heredoc (cat <<ENDJSON) and direct variable expansion (e.g.,"currentBranch": "$CURRENT_BRANCH"). This allows for schema confusion attacks where a malicious branch name containing double quotes and JSON syntax could manipulate the metadata parsed by the agent, potentially triggering unintended branch creation or quality gate bypasses. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of project-defined scripts and tools.
scripts/detect-gates.shautomatically identifies and executes commands from the project'spackage.json(such aslint,test,build). While this is the intended purpose of the skill, it creates a mechanism where an attacker with the ability to modifypackage.jsoncan achieve command execution when the agent runs the 'ship' task.- The skill is instructed to "attempt to fix the issues and re-run the failing gate," which grants the agent autonomy to execute shell commands based on the output of linting or testing tools.
Audit Metadata