Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF documents through various scripts such as
extract_form_field_info.pyandfill_fillable_fields.py. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded within a processed PDF could attempt to influence the agent's logic. - Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system via
scripts/extract_form_field_info.py,scripts/fill_fillable_fields.py, andscripts/check_fillable_fields.pywhich parse PDF content. - Boundary markers: The skill implements a structured, multi-step workflow in
forms.mdthat requires specific JSON formatting and manual validation steps, providing a functional boundary between data extraction and action. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system operations (reading/writing PDFs, JSON, and PNGs) and executing external CLI tools like
qpdfandpdftotext. - Sanitization: The scripts rely on standard parsing behavior from the
pypdfandjsonlibraries without additional content-level sanitization. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pycontains amonkeypatch_pydpf_methodfunction that dynamically overridespypdf.generic.DictionaryObject.get_inheritedat runtime. This is a localized modification designed to fix a specific known bug in thepypdflibrary (version 5.7.0) regarding selection list fields.
Audit Metadata