pentest-business-logic
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
mitmproxy_intercepttool, defined inreferences/tools.md, includes amodify_fnparameter. This parameter is intended to receive a Python function string to be applied to matching network flows, which facilitates the dynamic execution of code at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to interact with and process data from untrusted external web applications, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data from external targets enters the agent's context through tools like
burp_repeater,burp_intruder,mitmproxy_intercept, andplaywright_workflow(which logs network requests) as defined inreferences/tools.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflows.mddo not specify delimiters or guidelines to distinguish between trusted instructions and untrusted data received from target responses. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive system capabilities that could be targeted by an injection, including executing dynamic code (
mitmproxy_intercept), writing files (generate_polyglot), and performing network operations (python_requests_workflow). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, filtering, or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill defines tools that enable reading local files (
upload_file) and tools for making arbitrary network requests (python_requests_workflow,aiohttp_parallel). This combination provides the necessary primitives for data exfiltration if the agent is directed to sensitive local paths. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes wrappers for external security tools, including Burp Suite, mitmproxy, and Playwright, which involve executing subprocesses on the host system as described in
references/tools.md.
Audit Metadata