gong
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes conversation transcripts from the Gong API, which are external and untrusted data sources that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are fetched via
curlcommands inSKILL.mdand thetranscriptcommand inscripts/gong.sh. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a "Safety Boundaries" section providing instructions to the agent, but no technical delimiters or escaping mechanisms are used for the transcript data itself. - Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to read local configuration files (
~/.config/gong/credentials.json) and perform network operations viacurl. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of transcript content before it is passed to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper script
scripts/gong.shis vulnerable to parameter and command injection if the agent passes unvalidated input to the script's arguments. - Evidence: The script uses shell variables
$1(forcall_id) and$DAYSdirectly inside shell commands likedateand within JSON strings passed tocurl -d. For example,date -d "$DAYS days ago"and"{\"filter\":{\"callIds\":[\"$1\"]}}"perform no validation on the input, potentially allowing shell metacharacters to alter command execution or JSON structure.
Audit Metadata