architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input material (e.g., from the Madman/Whirlybird phases), creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in that content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Core Workflow Step 1 in
SKILL.md("Receive material"). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the input data.
- Capability inventory: The skill defines a complex workflow involving multiple phases but does not provide its own scripts, relying on general agent tools for execution.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any filtering or sanitization of the received content.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The
authormetadata field inSKILL.mdidentifies the author ashttps://github.com/dmitry, which conflicts with the provided author context ofjeffallan. This inconsistency in metadata could be misleading regarding the provenance of the skill.
Audit Metadata