architect

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input material (e.g., from the Madman/Whirlybird phases), creating a surface where malicious instructions embedded in that content could influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Core Workflow Step 1 in SKILL.md ("Receive material").
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in the input data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill defines a complex workflow involving multiple phases but does not provide its own scripts, relying on general agent tools for execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any filtering or sanitization of the received content.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The author metadata field in SKILL.md identifies the author as https://github.com/dmitry, which conflicts with the provided author context of jeffallan. This inconsistency in metadata could be misleading regarding the provenance of the skill.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 16, 2026, 02:40 PM