skills/jei-skappa/antmay/discussion/Gen Agent Trust Hub

discussion

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to update the thread log using a shell append command rather than standard file system APIs.
  • Evidence: In references/instructions/append-log-line.md, the instruction printf '%s\n' '- (type) gist with the reason folded in' >> <thread root>/log.md is provided for updating the thread log.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest multiple project-level documents which could contain untrusted instructions that influence agent behavior during discussions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads AGENTS.md, docs/glossary.md, decision records in docs/adr/ and docs/pdr/, seed.md, log.md, spec.md, and the delta/ directory as specified in SKILL.md under ## Inputs.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are defined to separate untrusted document content from the agent's internal instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to append to files on disk using shell-based printf commands.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or escape the content of the 'gist' or 'reason' before they are interpolated into the shell command template.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes shell commands dynamically based on the outcome of the user interview, which may involve untrusted input.
  • Evidence: The logging mechanism in references/instructions/append-log-line.md constructs a shell command string at runtime using variables derived from conversation context without enforced sanitization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 08:04 AM