discussion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to update the thread log using a shell append command rather than standard file system APIs.
- Evidence: In
references/instructions/append-log-line.md, the instructionprintf '%s\n' '- (type) gist with the reason folded in' >> <thread root>/log.mdis provided for updating the thread log. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest multiple project-level documents which could contain untrusted instructions that influence agent behavior during discussions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
AGENTS.md,docs/glossary.md, decision records indocs/adr/anddocs/pdr/,seed.md,log.md,spec.md, and thedelta/directory as specified inSKILL.mdunder## Inputs. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary instructions are defined to separate untrusted document content from the agent's internal instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to append to files on disk using shell-based
printfcommands. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions to sanitize or escape the content of the 'gist' or 'reason' before they are interpolated into the shell command template.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes shell commands dynamically based on the outcome of the user interview, which may involve untrusted input.
- Evidence: The logging mechanism in
references/instructions/append-log-line.mdconstructs a shell command string at runtime using variables derived from conversation context without enforced sanitization.
Audit Metadata