ai-usage
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule (viaPopenandruncalls inportable.py,run.py, and various usage scripts) to execute local AI provider command-line interfaces such asclaude,codex,grok,muse, andagy. These calls are used to query the provider's own usage endpoints or local agent servers as part of the primary reporting function. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
cursorbench.pyscript performs HTTP GET requests tohttps://cursor.com/cursorbenchandhttps://artificialanalysis.ai/to retrieve public model performance and cost benchmarks. These connections do not transmit user credentials or sensitive session data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from local session logs, which constitutes an ingestion point for untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: Local session and transcript files (e.g.,
~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl,~/.codex/sessions/**/*.jsonl,~/.grok/sessions/**/summary.json) are read bysession_info.pyto extract model identifiers. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions are present to prevent the agent from interpreting instructions that might be embedded in the logs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute commands via
subprocessand perform network requests viaurllib. - Sanitization: External data is parsed as structured JSON/JSONL, and only specific metadata fields (like model name and effort) are extracted for the report, limiting the attack surface.
Audit Metadata