ohmg
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to use
bunx oh-my-ag, which downloads and executes a package from the NPM registry at runtime. This introduces a dependency on unverified external code that could be updated or compromised independently of the skill. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By invoking
bunx, the skill performs a 'download-and-execute' pattern for theoh-my-agpackage. This allows for arbitrary code execution on the user's system under the context of the agent's environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to execute CLI commands such asoh-my-ag agent:spawn,bunx oh-my-ag doctor, andbunx oh-my-ag dashboard. Thedoctorcommand is specifically noted for its ability to 'repair' the system, which may involve modifying environment configurations or file permissions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator's design creates a significant surface for indirect injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Reads structured state and task requirements from
.serena/memories/and project files. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to separate agent logic from untrusted project data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Read,Write, andBashtools, can spawn new agents, and can bridge network traffic via SSE. - Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or command escaping when processing task descriptions or memory state into shell commands (e.g., inside
agent:spawn).
Audit Metadata