record-ui-walkthrough

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes subprocess.run across several scripts (build-video.py, check-kit.py, validate-video.py) to call ffmpeg, ffprobe, and playwright-cli. These calls are properly parameterized using lists to avoid shell injection and target standard system or local skill binaries.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's setup documentation (references/setup.md) instructs the user to download Text-to-Speech model files from a third-party GitHub repository (thewh1teagle/kokoro-onnx). The skill mitigates potential supply-chain risks by verifying these files against hardcoded SHA-256 hashes in scripts/preview_common.py before execution.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs playwright-cli to execute dynamically generated JavaScript code (hero.js, preflight.js) within a browser environment for automation purposes. Additionally, scripts/build-video-with-voice.py uses Python's importlib.util to load rendering logic from scripts/build-video.py at runtime.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes agent-provided descriptions and UI labels for video captions, creating an attack surface for subtitle manipulation.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters via shot-list.json and workflow.json (generated from agent-defined hero scripts).
  • Boundary markers: The skill enforces strict length constraints (maximum 18 words) and prohibits newlines in descriptions.
  • Capability inventory: Captions are rendered into video frames using ffmpeg's libass filter.
  • Sanitization: The ass_text function in scripts/build-video.py escapes backslashes and curly braces using the \u2060 (Word Joiner) character to prevent the injection of malicious formatting tags into the ASS subtitle files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 10, 2026, 12:30 PM