gws-calendar
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external Google Calendar events, which represents a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests untrusted data through API methods such as
events.get,events.list, andcalendarList.listas defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within event fields (e.g., descriptions or titles).
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive write capabilities via the
gwsbinary, including the ability toinsert,update,patch, anddeleteevents, calendars, and access control rules (ACLs). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from the calendar API before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of a local command-line interface to interact with Google Workspace.
- Evidence: The skill requires the
gwsbinary (as noted in therequiresmetadata) and instructs the agent to execute commands using thegws calendarandgws schemapatterns.
Audit Metadata