skillshare
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The primary function of the skill is to install and update skills from external Git repositories (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket, etc.) and local paths. These skills are then synchronized to directories where AI agents (such as Claude, Cursor, and Windsurf) read and execute them, creating a significant attack surface for third-party code execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
skillshare hub addcommand allows fetching JSON indices from arbitrary user-provided URLs. Additionally, theinstallandupdatecommands perform network operations to download content from remote Git hosts. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/run.shscript executes a local binary namedskillsharefrom the user's cache directory (~/.cache/skillshare/bin/) or the system PATH. The skill also performs extensive filesystem operations, including creating symlinks and file copies across multiple sensitive tool directories (e.g.,~/.claude/,~/.ssh/-related paths are mentioned in context of audit). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external
SKILL.mdfiles from remote sources, which makes it susceptible to indirect prompt injection. While the tool provides a built-inauditcommand to mitigate these risks, the inclusion of--skip-auditand--forceflags allows the agent or an attacker to bypass these security controls entirely. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
collectcommand allows the agent to pull local (non-symlinked) files from target directories back into a source directory. These files can then be synchronized to other targets or pushed to a remote repository via thepushcommand, potentially leading to the accidental exposure of local configurations or sensitive instructions.
Audit Metadata