teamcity-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is entirely built around the use of the
teamcityCLI to perform operations on TeamCity servers. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Provides instructions for executing commands on remote build agents through
teamcity agent exec <id> <cmd>and opening interactive shells viateamcity agent term <id>. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Contains capabilities to access sensitive data, including retrieving secrets with
teamcity project token get, downloading artifacts withteamcity run download, and accessing potentially sensitive logs usingteamcity run log. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: References an
--insecure-storageflag forteamcity auth loginwhich allows storing tokens in plain text rather than the system keyring, though this is presented as an explicit user-selected option. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface (Category 8) as it ingest untrusted data from TeamCity build logs, project metadata, and test results.
- Ingestion points:
teamcity run log,teamcity run tests,teamcity run view,teamcity project view(processed in SKILL.md and references/workflows.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions for handling external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute commands on agents (
teamcity agent exec), start builds with arbitrary parameters (teamcity run start), and modify project settings (teamcity project param set). - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation of data retrieved from the TeamCity server is mentioned before processing.
Audit Metadata