shipping-a-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from several sources which could be manipulated by external actors to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Processes Pull Request comments in
review-comments.mdusinggh pr view --commentsandgh api. Reads repository-hosted templates increating.mdandbody.mdvia.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md. Consumes external planning data (plan.summary) increating.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions are provided when the agent reads these external data sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive operations including
git push(with--force-with-lease),gh pr create,gh pr edit, andgh pr ready. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands for Git and GitHub operations. Specifically,
screenshots.mdprovides a bash script for creating git trees from local files. While the file paths are within a controlled workspace directory, the reliance on shell script generation for repository state changes increases the risk of unexpected execution if input data such as filenames were influenced by malicious input.
Audit Metadata