delivery-loop-retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a bundled Python script (
scripts/collect_trace.py) to automate the collection of performance metrics from local session logs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive session history data located in
~/.claude/projectsand agent memory in the project's.claude/agent-memorydirectory. - This access is fundamental to the skill's purpose of generating retrospectives. No network operations or attempts to exfiltrate this data were identified.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from session transcripts and episode logs.
- Ingestion points: Historical transcript data from
~/.claude/projects/and episodic memory notes from.claude/agent-memory/. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the logs being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local Python scripts, read agent configuration files, and write Markdown reports to the project directory.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping content extracted from transcripts before it is used to formulate improvement targets.
Audit Metadata