transformer

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell escape sequence (!) to execute cat ~/.claude/skills/prompt/SKILL.md. This method of file access bypasses standard security-monitored tools and executes commands directly on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By using shell commands to read from a hidden application directory (~/.claude/), the skill accesses local data outside of the immediate project scope. This pattern could be adapted to read more sensitive configuration or credential files in the user's home directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a transformer for other skill files provided via the $ARGUMENTS parameter, creating an indirect prompt injection surface where the content of those files can influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: External file path provided through the $ARGUMENTS variable.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no clear delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested content.
  • Capability inventory: Ability to execute shell commands (cat) and perform text transformation/reasoning tasks.
  • Sanitization: None; the skill ingests raw content from the specified file path and processes it directly.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 12, 2026, 07:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — transformer