wjs-voicedrop-post-processing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes article content retrieved from the VoiceDrop database via MCP tools, which introduces an indirect prompt injection surface where untrusted data could attempt to influence the agent.
- Ingestion points: Article text is fetched using the
voicedrop MCPtool based on identifiers provided in the$ARGUMENTSfield. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or 'ignore' directives to isolate the fetched article content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to read articles and create new article versions through the VoiceDrop MCP interface.
- Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic for the fetched article content is implemented beyond basic presence checks.
- [SAFE]: The skill incorporates 'Iron Laws' that explicitly prohibit high-risk and destructive operations, such as publishing, deleting, or modifying community settings, ensuring the agent operates within a restricted safety scope.
- [SAFE]: All infrastructure components mentioned, such as the
launchdpoller (com.jianshuo.voicedrop-postprocess) and thevoicedropMCP tools, are associated with the vendor's own platform and represent standard automation patterns.
Audit Metadata