skills/jim60105/copilot-prompt/docx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

docx

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/office/soffice.py defines a C source string that is written to a temporary file, compiled at runtime using gcc, and loaded as a shared library via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. This mechanism is employed to shim networking-related system calls to allow LibreOffice to function in restricted or sandboxed environments.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Office documents as its primary function, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: External document data enters the agent context through scripts/office/unpack.py and pandoc text extraction. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific markers to isolate document content or instructions to ignore embedded commands. 3. Capability inventory: Several scripts execute shell commands via the subprocess module (scripts/accept_changes.py, scripts/office/soffice.py). 4. Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize or escape extracted document content before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the subprocess module across multiple files to orchestrate external binaries including soffice, gcc, git, and pandoc for document conversion, comparison, and compilation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 2, 2026, 10:42 AM