docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pydefines a C source string that is written to a temporary file, compiled at runtime usinggcc, and loaded as a shared library via theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable. This mechanism is employed to shim networking-related system calls to allow LibreOffice to function in restricted or sandboxed environments. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Office documents as its primary function, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points: External document data enters the agent context through
scripts/office/unpack.pyandpandoctext extraction. 2. Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific markers to isolate document content or instructions to ignore embedded commands. 3. Capability inventory: Several scripts execute shell commands via thesubprocessmodule (scripts/accept_changes.py,scripts/office/soffice.py). 4. Sanitization: There is no logic present to sanitize or escape extracted document content before processing. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocessmodule across multiple files to orchestrate external binaries includingsoffice,gcc,git, andpandocfor document conversion, comparison, and compilation.
Audit Metadata